Lebanon's Ministerial Policy Statement -STL article

 The most contentious item in the new cabinet's policy statement is undoubtedly the one dealing with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. As-Safir newspaper has published a leaked copy of the full text in Arabic. I couldn't find an English translation, below is my own attempt at translating it myself. The paragraph is intentionally vague in Arabic, I hope I managed in capturing the exact tone. As I argued yesterday, PM Mikati is trying to perform a delicate balancing act between internal and external pressure with respect to the STL, an attitude clearly reflected in the leaked statement. 

‘The Indictment’: A Thriller lacking in action. The STL Predicament

So we finally have it. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictment in the Hariri murder case has been handed to the Lebanese General Prosecutor Sa’id Mirza. Although the indictment itself has not been made public yet, its contents have been widely leaked  in keeping with the STL’s shoddy record. The indictment reportedly names four suspects implicated in the assassination, all members of Hezbollah. The General Prosecutor has thirty days to arrest the suspects before the indictment is made public. The STL’s fondness for delayed gratification is exemplary, an attitude that seems to be shared by Lebanese politicians now. The responses to the indictment so far have been largely evasive, reflecting a lack of eagerness to bring things to a conclusion. Inaction will be the main headline for the foreseeable future.  

Saad Hariri: The limits of politics

I met the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri for the first time this week, when I went to a talk he gave at the London School of Economics. The talk itself was very general. Hariri discussed the Arab Peace Initiative which was first proposed at the Beirut Summit for Arab leaders in 2002, and explained the need for peace in the Middle East which he asserted that Lebanon’s internal stability depends on. He touched on the economic achievements of his and the preceding government and outlined how building on those achievements is vital to fulfilling the aspirations of the Lebanese people.

Hariri Pop Idol

By Joseph El-Khoury, re-published with permission from Arabdemocracy

Yesterday night I came face to face with Saad Hariri for the first time. I had shaken hands in a past life with his late father more than 12 years ago and was looking forward to draw a comparison between father and son. The Lebanese Embassy in London provided the backdrop to an evening reception where the banking industry was overrepresented. Having sampled the canapés and exchanged opinions on the resilience of the Lebanese economy, they laid down their glasses to clap in their hero as he appeared past a group of heavily botoxed ladies. A friend pointed out that Saad Hariri looked a defeated man. Perhaps I thought! I rather found that his tone, posture and demeanour still revealed a degree of discomfort in his role, despite the 5 years of experience as heir to his father’s political legacy.

Back to the Future: The Fate of Harirism

Yesterday, Al-Akhbar newspaper published a story speculating about two possible outcomes to the current confrontation between Prime Minister Hariri and Hezbollah. In the first scenario, a Syrian-Saudi agreement allows Hariri to stay in power in return for blocking the awaited Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictment and withdrawing his backing of the tribunal. The second scenario will be put into action should the Saudi-Syrian agreement fail to materialise. Hezbollah would then move to replace Hariri through peaceful protests and the subsequent resignation of the 8th of March ministers from the cabinet.

Hariri / Hezbollah: In search of a new division of labour

The political fluctuations in Lebanon are often reported through meteorological metaphors. This is partially due to the fact that we have as much control over politics as we do over the weather. If the media is to be believed these days, rough storms are heading our way. Allegations of impending coups from one side are reciprocated by allegations about secret conspiracies with the west and Israel from the other. The truth, as usual, is much less dramatic.

It is easy to get carried away with the shrill tone of political reporting and rhetoric, but it’s often forgotten that this is usually part of the political jostling before anticipated settlements. The big headline for this period is the precise nature of the political arrangement that will ensue from Syria’s return as the main ‘player’ on the Lebanese scene. Saad Hariri’s exoneration of Syria and his statement about the political accusations that implicated it in the assassination of his father has created the ground conditions for Syria’s renewed patronage over Lebanon, but the shape of this stewardship is yet to be worked out.

Hariri and Hezbollah are effectively engaged in a power struggle to ensure the most advantageous positions within this arrangement. But this is not an open ended struggle; it’s more of an attempt at judging what will be possible under this new paradigm. All the talk of coups and conspiracies is part of the usual background noise that precedes such resolutions.

It’s worth remembering Hassan Nasrallah’s statement on the eve of Burj Abi Haidar clashes in which he declared that Hezbollah can overthrow the government in the parliament and does not need to agitate on the street in order to achieve this objective. The one thing that prevents Hezbollah and its allies from seizing power is Syrian influence. The blunt question to ask is if Hezbollah really believed in all the allegations about their opponents’ collusion with Israel, then why is it letting them run the country?

Let’s remember that the previous arrangement that ended the civil war and dictated how the country was run for a decade and a half was also orchestrated through a Saudi-Syrian agreement, albeit with a much larger role for the US at the time. The arrangement that ensued from the Taif Agreement created a division of labour between Hezbollah and Hariri the father, famously known as the development/resistance formula. In other words, Hariri was charged with development and reconstruction while Hezbollah handled the resistance against Israel.

Part of the explanation for the tension we are witnessing today is that this formula is not easy to resurrect for various reasons. For starters, the strict division of labour is not adequate any longer. Hezbollah has been increasingly more active in reconstruction and development since 2006, and it has had several achievements on that front. (Helped with the flow of Qatari and Iranian funds.) Hariri’s intelligence apparatus meanwhile has had various successes in discovering Israeli spy rings and arresting high-profile agents. Their roles have become increasingly overlapping.

This is partially more relevant in the case of Hezbollah because Hariri’s spy catcher apparatus is not an integral part of his political project. Hezbollah’s role in fighting Israel on the other hand cannot be expressed as aggressively as it used to be anymore. The 2006 war is still seen as a victory by the Party but, as Nasrallah remarked afterwards, the cost was quite high. Despite the talk of war that we constantly hear from both sides, it’s unlikely that Hezbollah or Israel see any strategic gains in any major confrontations anymore.

Hezbollah’s recently opened Museum of Resistance in Mleeta illustrates the nature of this new phase in Hezbollah’s existence. It is an indication that Hezbollah is now ready to see military resistance as part of its history. This does not mean that Hezbollah will lay down its weapons, but that any confrontations with Israel in the future are likely to be limited in nature. You don’t build a $4 million project and plan a large touristic development around it if you’re expecting to be engaged in a war.

The recent frequent critiques of Solidere are another indication of the changing nature of this division of labour between Hezbollah and Hariri. During the period of Syrian hegemony, criticism of Hariri’s monopoly over development was never translated into any meaningful action or alternative plan. In fact, the law that brought Solidere into being wouldn’t have been approved without the consent of all the major parliamentary blocks at the time. It’s very hypocritical today to deny responsibility for the decisions taken in the 90s by any of the political blocks that were in parliament then. Such criticism today is more of a declaration of intentions that, in the coming period, Hariri’s monopoly on development will be challenged.

Will Hariri be willing to concede? We will have to wait and see. But two things are for sure. First, the current escalation is only part of the tactical jostling and its effects will be contained in time in preparation for the next political period. Second, the division of labour between Hariri and Hezbollah will be reproduced in a new format, one that we haven’t quite grasped yet. We, as always, remain as spectators in all of this.

The Revolution was Televised, hence its downfall

Prime Minister Saad Hariri officially declared The Cedar Revolution over yesterday when he announced that Syria was not responsible for the assassination of his father. This declaration brings to an end a tumultuous era of Lebanon’s history that lasted just over five years. In truth, the ‘revolution’ had lasted for one month exactly, but it took a much longer time for the realisation to sink in. Hariri’s declaration provided the closure that many had been seeking.

"This was a political accusation, and this political accusation has ended," thus spoke Hariri. But a political exoneration is the mirror image of a political accusation. Much as Hariri and his allies were wrong to make the accusation in the first place, he is repeating the mistake now by making this declaration. How can we be expected to believe that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is independent when Hariri has just decided to eliminate one of the suspects on his own initiative?